



# WHO AM I?

Ryan Zacha is a Principal Solutions Architect spearheading Zero Trust Architecture for Booz Allen's Federal civilian and DoD clients supporting Zero Trust assessment, developing solutions to complex technical problems, and scaling capabilities in boundary protection, threat modeling, and network defense. Ryan currently leads a team of engineers and architects supporting DISA's Thunderdome project and is the technical lead on a DoD Zero Trust Architecture prototype.




# **AGENDA**

- Aligning to a Maturity Model
- Common Understanding Through Capability Mapping
- CISA & DoD Capability Maturity Models
- Maturity Assessment Methodology
- Where to Start
- Conditional-Based Access Example
- High-Level ZT Architecture
- Remote Access Architectures
- ICS/SCADA Reference Architecture

## **ALINGING TO A MATURITY MODEL**


### **CISA Maturity Model**

Align to CISA's Maturity Model




### DoD ZT Reference Architecture

Align to DoD CIO's Reference Architecture v2.0



### **Tailored Model**

Tailor a model unique to your needs




### Supporting Documents and Frameworks


- NIST 800-207: Zero Trust Architecture
- OMB M-22-09: Moving the U.S. Government Toward Zero Trust Cybersecurity Principles
- Vendor Specific Approaches (Microsoft, Google BeyondTrust, Netflix LISA)
- DoD Zero Trust Strategy (Nov 7<sup>th</sup>, 2022)

### COMMON UNDERSTANDING THROUGH CAPABILITY MAPPING


- Prior to November 2022 (DoD ZT Strategy release), the existing maturity models and reference architectures lacked capability mappings to each pillar to help organizations assess their current state and create roadmaps to track execution against.
- Through internal effort at Booz Allen and validated against DoD ZT Strategy we mapped security capabilities (e.g., Data Tagging, Asset Inventory, Micro-Segmentation) to each of the 5 or 7 pillars (depending on CISA vs. DoD Model) to allow a common maturity level understanding.
- Once the capabilities are mapped it opens the door for maturity assessment through current state assessment, target state creation, and capability road mapping.

### CISA CAPABILITY MAPPING





### DOD CAPABILITY MAPPING



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\*Image DoD Zero Trust Strategy (defense.gov)

### MATURITY ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY



# ZERO TRUST TARGET STATES AND ROADMAPS ARE INFORMED BY THREE DISTINCT INPUTS; COLLECTIVELY, THESE INPUTS PROVIDE THE BASE OF INSIGHT REQUIRED TO DEFINE A PATH FORWARD FOR ZERO TRUST

#### **CURRENT STATE ASSESSMENT**

Attain objective insights into the organizations' Zero Trust strengths and improvement areas



#### TOOLS AND TECHNOLOGY MATRIX

Identify tool optimization, integration, overlap, and sustainment opportunities as technical solutions for recommendations



#### STAKEHOLDER TARGET DEFINITIONS

Work collaboratively with pillar stakeholders to define maturity levels that will reduce security risk without increasing operational risk

### APPROACH TO DEFINING AN INTEGRATED ZERO TRUST ARCHITECTURE ROADMAP



Step One & Two. Anchor approach into a single Zero Trust framework. Conduct Assessment



**Step Three.** Work across the pillars of Zero Trust to create Zero Trust-relevant roadmaps based on maturity increasing initiatives. Also provide an analysis of in use tools and technology with suggestions for divestment and expansion.



**Step Four.** Leverage pillarspecific roadmaps to develop a phased plan to reach maturity.

#### **ZTA MATURITY MODEL**



Serves as a framework for understanding and planning for Zero Trust

#### TARGET STATE



Provides an overview o pillar specific focal areas for capability building

#### **T&T ANALYSIS**



Examine current licensing and tool usage relevant to Zero Trust initiatives

#### RECOMMENDATIONS



Breaks down proposals and dependencies associated with pillarspecific focal areas

#### **ROADMAP**



Offers a single pane of glass for capability building initiatives across each pillar of our Zero Trust model

#### IMPLEMENTATION PLAN



Serves as a framework for understanding and planning for Zero Trust

### WHERE TO START

### Validate an Existing or Build a Target State Architecture for each of the 5 pillars

- Include supporting Automation & Orchestration and Visibility & Analytics features, platforms, and systems
- Zero Trust Architecture's core is Data Security but there is a heavy interaction between the Data, User, and Device pillars to ensure enforcement.

Assess your highest value data, applications, and attack surface to prioritize implementation

Build Roadmaps for each Pillar to track capability maturity inclusive of dependency mapping with a 3-to-5-year horizon to guide the organization

Use a simplified ZT assessment process (can look different for each organization) to remain aligned to strategy and highlight areas of concern and risk to completion

# CONDITIONAL ACCESS EXAMPLE


ZTNA platform evaluates a user's <u>group</u> and the user's <u>device hardening</u> status before granting access to a resource

LISER WEEK	USER GROUP	DEVICE- HARDENING STATUS	ACCESS LEVEL GRANTED	APP 1 LOW VALUE	APP 2 MODERATE VALUE	APP 3 HIGH VALUE
А	Authorized to High Value	<ul><li>✓ Latest OS patch</li><li>✓ Antivirus running</li><li>✓ Disk encryption enabled</li></ul>	Full Access	ALLOW	ALLOW	ALLOW
А	Authorized to High Value	<ul><li>Latest OS patch</li><li>✓ Antivirus running</li><li>✓ Disk encryption enabled</li></ul>	Limited Access (High→Mod)	ALLOW	ALLOW	DENY
В	Authorized to Mod Value	<ul><li>✓ Latest OS patch</li><li>✓ Antivirus running</li><li>✓ Disk encryption enabled</li></ul>	Full Access (for this user profile)	ALLOW	ALLOW	DENY
В	Authorized to Mod Value	<ul><li>★ Latest OS patch</li><li>★ Antivirus running</li><li>✓ Disk encryption enabled</li></ul>	No Access	DENY	DENY	DENY

## HIGH-LEVEL ZERO TRUST ARCHITECTURE

- Endpoint

  Monitors and manages devices; provides device attributes for ZTNA enforcement
- Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA)
  Implements conditional access to the network based on endpoint device posture and user identity provided by ICAM
- Application Security Stack (AppSS)
  Scalable security stack providing micro segmentation, intrusion, and lateral movement protections against network and application-layer based attacks
- 4 Application Conditional Access
  Provides application-specific conditional access checks
- Leveraged by ZTNA & Application
  Conditional Access components to provide
  user identity information
- Data Tagging and Labeling
  Apply metadata to files/data for policy enforcement
- Visibility and Analytics
  Monitors all components, providing analytics and incident response




### REMOTE ACCESS ARCHITECTURES


#### • Remote Access Architectures:

- 1. Centralized Security Stacks
  - Increases delay due to 'hairpining' at locations not close to the source or destination
- 2. Direct to Internet/Cloud
  - o Easy to connect remote users to one SaaS/laaS application
  - Difficult to scale; each vendor provides their own security solution impacting operations and visibility
  - Reliance on SaaS provider security
- 3. Secure Access Service Edge (SASE)/Security as a Service (SECaas)
  - Easy to scale
  - o Security data visibility through one centralized platform
  - o Infrastructure and software maintenance is SASE/SECaaS provider responsibility


# <u>Traditional Centralized Security Access Points</u>




### **Direct to Internet/Cloud**




## SASE/SECaaS



# ICS/SCADA SECURITY - REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE





# Questions?

### **Contact Us:**

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